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Abstract
In horizontal collaborations, carriers form coalitions in order to perform parts
of their logistics operations jointly. By exchanging transportation requests
among each other, they can operate more efficiently and in a more sustain-
able way. Collaborative vehicle routing has been extensively discussed in
the literature. We identify three major streams of research: (i) centralized
collaborative planning, (ii) decentralized planning without auctions, and (ii)
auction-based decentralized planning. For each of them we give a structured
overview on the state of knowledge and discuss future research directions.
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1. Introduction
The transportation industry is highly competitive and companies need to
aim for a maximum level of efficiency in order to stay in business. Fierce
competition brings prices down and therefore profit margins have declined to
an extremely low level. To increase efficiency, these companies can establish
collaborations, where parts of their logistics operations are planned jointly.
By collaborative vehicle routing we refer to all kinds of cooperations, which
are intended to increase the efficiency of vehicle fleet operations.1 By in-
creasing efficiency, collaborations also serve ecological goals. It is well known
∗Corresponding author
Email addresses: margaretha.gansterer@univie.ac.at (Margaretha Gansterer),
richard.hartl@univie.ac.at (Richard F. Hartl)
1We use the terms collaboration and cooperation interchangeable. In the literature,
there is an agreement that collaboration is a strong type of cooperation. However, the
boundary between them is vague (Cruijssen et al., 2007c).
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that transportation is one of the main contributors of CO2 emissions (Ballot
and Fontane, 2010). Thus, public authorities are encouraging companies to
collaborate. They not only aim at reduced emissions of harmful substances,
but also on reduced road congestion, and noise pollution. Moreover, collab-
orations in logistics have been shown to increase service levels, gain market
shares, enhance capacities, and reduce the negative impacts of the bullwhip
effect (Audy et al., 2012). Thus, it is not surprising that collaborative vehicle
routing is an active research area of high practical importance.
Related reviews by Verdonck et al. (2013) and Cruijssen et al. (2007c)
exist. Both are dealing with transportation collaborations. However, Ver-
donck et al. (2013) focus on the operational planning of road transportation
carriers (i.e. the owners and operators of transportation equipment) only.
The perspective of collaborating shippers (i.e. the owners of the shipments)
is not taken into account. Furthermore, they do not consider studies on cen-
tralized planning (i.e. collaboration in case of full information). We observe
that about 45% of the related literature refers to central planning situations.
This is an important aspect of collaborative vehicle routing, where a central-
ized authority is in charge of allocating requests such that requirements of all
collaborators are met. Furthermore, we identify two classes of decentralized
settings, which are auction-based and non-auction-based collaborations.
Cruijssen et al. (2007c) give an overview on different types of horizontal
collaboration, i.e. the levels of integration among collaborators. They do
not consider operational planning problems. We find that almost 60% of the
related articles were published in the last 3 years. These articles have not
been covered in both of the existent reviews.
The review by Guajardo and Ro¨nnqvist (2016) deals with cost allocation
in collaborative transportation, which is also an important aspect in collab-
orative vehicle routing. Because of this very recent survey, we can keep the
cost allocation part short.
Given the high volume of recent literature on collaborative vehicle routing
it is now appropriate to provide a review on the state of knowledge. The
contribution of our survey is threefold:
1. We also consider centralized collaborative planning.
2. We survey the literature of the last few years.
3. We give a new and broader classification of articles.
The remainder of our survey is organized as follows. The research method-
ology used is described in Section 2. Classifications and definitions are pro-
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vided in Section 3. Centralized collaborative planning is surveyed in Sec-
tion 4. Sections 5 and 6 give overviews on decentralized planning with and
without auctions, respectively. Each section closes with a discussion on fu-
ture research directions. A summarizing conclusion is given in Section 7.
2. Research methodology
In our review, we focus on studies where operations research models and
solution techniques are applied. Pure empirical studies, not focusing on the
operational planning problems, are not considered. However, readers inter-
ested in these empirical studies are referred to, e.g., Cruijssen et al. (2007b),
Lydeka and Adomavicˇius (2007), Ballot and Fontane (2010), Schmoltzi and
Wallenburg (2011). We also do not consider studies, where the main focus
is on general design of coalitions rather, while the transportation planning
problems of collaborators are neglected (e.g. Tate, 1996; Verstrepen et al.,
2009; Voruganti et al., 2011; Audy et al., 2012; Guajardo and Ro¨nnqvist,
2015). Regarding application fields, we limit our survey to studies on road
transportation. Collaborations in rail (e.g. Kuo et al., 2008), naval (e.g.
Agarwal and Ergun, 2010), and air (e.g. Ankersmit et al., 2014) transporta-
tion lead to interesting planning problems, but these studies do not fit within
the scope of this survey. We initially did not omit any study based on its
type (primary, secondary; journal articles, proceedings, etc.) or its year of
publication.
With this scope in mind, we searched library databases, where the major
journals in operations research, operations management, management science
etc. are covered. Used search terms were basically combinations of
• ”collaboration”, ”cooperation”, ”coalition”, ”alliance” and
• ”transportation”, ”routing”, ”logistics”, ”freight”, ”carrier”, ”shipper”.
By this, we identified a first set of relevant studies. At this point we
decided to only consider journal publications, in order to survey a reasonable
number of articles. For each of the remaining papers we screened the reference
list and added articles that had not been find in the first step. Finally, we
applied a descendancy approach, which goes from old information to new
information, by screening all articles that cite one of the papers that we found
relevant. We proceeded until we converged to a final set of publications.
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3. Classifications and definitions
In our review, we distinguish between centralized and decentralized col-
laborative planning. In Figures 1- 3, we provide a generalized illustrations of
collaborative and non-collaborative settings. In the non-collaborative setting
(Figure1), each participant i, i ∈ (A, ..., N) maximizes his individual profit
Pi. This profit depends on his set of requests Ri, the payments pi(Ri) that
he gets for his requests Ri, and his costs ci(Ri). The capacity usage Capi of
a participant i is limited by his available capacity Li.
A B
BB N
Figure 1: Generalized illustration of a non-collaborative setting with profit (Pi) maximiz-
ing participants i, i ∈ (A, ..., N), with limited capacity Li. Capi is the capacity usage.
In case of centralized planning (Figure 2), the total profit is maximized
jointly (which is denoted as ideal model by Schneeweiss, 2003).
In decentralized settings (Figure 3), collaborators agree on a mechanism
for exchanging subsets of their requests by revealing no or only limited in-
formation. R¯ is the set of requests that have been offered for exchange. In
our study, the research stream on decentralized planning is further split up
in non-auction-based and auction-based studies.
All papers are classified based on the model formulation of the routing
problem used. Here, the following categories can be identified.
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Figure 2: Generalized illustration of centralized planning with profit (Pi) maximizing
participants i, i ∈ (A, ..., N), with limited capacity Li. Capi is the capacity usage.
• Vehicle routing problems (VRP), which give the optimal sets of routes
for fleets of vehicles in order to visit a given set of customers (e.g.
Gendreau et al., 2008).
• Arc routing problems (ARP), which assume that customers are located
on arcs that have to be traversed. The capacitated ARP is the arc-
based counterpart to the node-based VRP (e.g. Wøhlk, 2008).
• Inventory routing problems (IRP), which combine VRP with inventory
management (e.g. Bertazzi et al., 2008).
• Lane covering problems (LCP), which aim at finding a set of tours
covering all lanes with the objective of minimizing the total travel cost
(e.g. Ghiani et al., 2008). A lane is the connection between the pickup
and the delivery node of a full truckload (FTL) request.
• Minimum cost flow problems (MCFP), which aim at sending goods
through a network in the cheapest possible way (e.g. Klein, 1967).
• Assignment problems (AP), where vehicles are assigned to requests,
such that total costs are minimized (e.g. Munkres, 1957).
We also indicate whether models assume customers to have delivery time
windows (TW) or not. Another frequently appearing extension are pickup
5
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Figure 3: Generalized illustration of decentralized planning with profit (Pi) maximizing
participants i, i ∈ (A, ..., N), with limited capacity Li. Capi is the capacity usage. R¯ is
the subset of requests that have been offered for exchange.
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and delivery (PD) requests. This means that goods have to be picked up at
some node and to be delivered to another node, where pickup and delivery
locations do not necessarily coincide with a depot.
Articles can be further classified based on the investigated types of ship-
ment. These can either be FTL or less than truckload (LTL). FTL can of
course be seen as a special case of LTL, where the size of customer orders is
equal to the vehicle’s capacity. Hence, LTL models are applicable for FTL
settings as well. However, FTL is often used in the transportation of a sin-
gle product, whereas LTL is usually used to transport multiple products in
small volumes from depots to customers or from customers to customers.
A typical application area for LTL is parcel delivery (Dai and Chen, 2012;
Parragh et al., 2008). Figure 4 shows an example of non-collaborative and
of collaborative vehicle routes of LTL carriers.
An example of collaboration between FTL carriers is displayed in Fig-
ure 5. Carrier A drives from customer c to customer a, and from customer a
to customer b, while carrier B is serving lanes b-c and b-d. By collaboration
the carriers can avoid three empty return trips (Adenso-Dı´az et al., 2014a).
It should be mentioned that b-c can of course also be used by carrier A in a
non-collaborative setting. In this case this carrier has only one empty return
trip. However, the collaboration with carrier B still improves the situation
of carrier A.
Players in transportation collaborations might be carriers (also denoted
as freight forwarders, logistics service providers, or third party logistics providers)
and shippers. Carriers are assumed to be the owners and operators of trans-
portation equipment, while shippers own or supply the shipments. Joint
routing planning is typically assumed to be done by carriers. When ship-
pers consider collaboration, they identify attractive bundles of lanes, helping
carriers to reduce empty trips in return of better rates (Ergun et al., 2007b).
We observe that the huge majority of papers focuses on carrier-related
cooperations. We agree with Cruijssen et al. (2007a), that from the planning
perspective it does not matter whether carriers or shippers are in charge
of the process. However, in decentralized settings the issue of information
asymmetries has to be taken into account. Shippers and carriers typically
do not having the same level of information. We therefore find it useful to
distinguish whether carriers or shippers are the players in a collaboration.
In the papers surveyed, a variety of both, exact and heuristic solution
methodologies are represented. An overview on these methodologies is given
in Figure 6.
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Figure 4: Example for non-collaborative and collaborative vehicle routes of three LTL
carriers with pickup and delivery requests (Gansterer and Hartl, 2016a).
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Figure 5: Example for non-collaborative and collaborative vehicle routes of two FTL
carriers. Dotted arcs are empty return trips (Adenso-Dı´az et al., 2014a)
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An important aspect of collaborative operations is how to share the gained
benefits. It is shown in Guajardo and Ro¨nnqvist (2016) that most problems
in collaborative transportation use sharing methods based on cooperative
game theory. The authors identify more than 40 different methods, which
they categorize as traditional or ad hoc concepts. However, they show that
in the huge majority of studies, one of the following three methods is used:
• the well-known Shapley value (Shapley, 1953), which is generally the
most applied method (e.g. Kimms and Kozeletskyi, 2016; Vanovermeire
and So¨rensen, 2014; Engevall et al., 2004).
• proportional methods, where each carrier j gets a share αj of the total
profit (e.g. O¨zener et al., 2013; Berger and Bierwirth, 2010; Frisk et al.,
2010
• the nucleolus method initially defined by Schmeidler (1969) (e.g. Agar-
wal and Ergun, 2010; Guajardo and Jo¨rnsten, 2015; Go¨the-Lundgren
et al., 1996).
In the literature, there are basically two streams of research: (i) articles
that focus on the transportation problems, while profit sharing is not taken
into account, and (ii) articles dealing with profit sharing, while the trans-
portation problem is neglected. There are only a few studies (for instance
Krajewska et al., 2008), where both aspects are combined. Thus, our survey
aims at building bridges between these two worlds. In our sections on future
research, we provide several suggestions how profit sharing aspects should be
integrated into the collaborative planning processes.
4. Centralized collaborative planning
If collaborative decisions are made by a central authority having full infor-
mation, this is referred to as centralized collaborative planning. An example
for such a central authority might be an online platform providing services for
collaborative decision making (Dai and Chen, 2012). It is obvious that under
full information, the decision maker has to tackle a standard optimization
problem, since the collaborative aspect is diminished by information disclo-
sure. Thus, each transportation planning problem might be interpreted as
a collaborative transportation planning problem that a decision maker with
full information has to solve. However, to have in this review a reasonable
11
scope, we only survey studies that contribute to the collaborative aspect of
transportation planning. An example for such a contribution is, for instance,
given in Wang et al. (2014). In this study the central authority does not
have full power to find an optimal solution by simply exchanging requests. It
rather has to decide on the degree of collaboration taking both outsourcing
and request exchange into consideration.
It can be observed that that there are two streams of research in this
area:
• the assessment of the potential benefits of centralized collaborative
planning versus non-cooperative settings. In non-cooperative settings
players do not show any kind of collaborative efforts. We refer to this
research stream as Collaboration Gain Assessment (CGA).
• innovative models or innovative solutions approaches for centralized
collaborative planning. These studies will be denoted as Methodological
Contributions (MC).
Table 1 gives an overview on studies contributing to centralized collabo-
rative planning. We classify them according to the categories given above,
and highlight their main characteristics.
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4.1. Collaboration gain assessment
One of the first studies to systematically assess the potentials of collabo-
rative vehicle routing was presented by Cruijssen et al. (2007a). The authors
consider a system with multiple companies, each having a separate set of
distribution orders. Goods are picked up at a single distribution center and
delivered to customer sites. Both, a non-cooperative setting, where each
company solves the planning problem independently, and a cooperative set-
ting, where routes are planned jointly are investigated. It is shown that joint
route planning can achieve synergy values of up to 30%.
Many other studies confirm the observation of Cruijssen et al. (2007a),
that centralized collaborative planning has the potential to improve total
profits by around 20-30% of the non-cooperative solution (e.g. Montoya-
Torres et al., 2016; Soysal et al., 2016). A real-world setting, where a local
courier service of a multi-national logistics company is investigated by Lin
(2008). It is shown that the cooperative strategy, where courier routes are
planned jointly, outperforms the non-cooperative setting by up to 20% of
travel cost.
Joint route planning is generally considered to be done by carriers (e.g.
Dai and Chen, 2012; Buijs et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2010a), but also shippers
can be involved in joint route planning, as long as they have direct control
over the flows of goods (Cruijssen et al., 2007a). However, merging FTL
lanes is mostly assumed to be done by shippers (e.g. Adenso-Dı´az et al.,
2014a; Ergun et al., 2007b; Kuyzu, 2017). Here again one might argue, that
also carriers can be involved in this type of horizontal collaboration, as it is
considered by, e.g., Liu et al. (2010a).
Horizontal collaborations not only follow economical but also ecological
goals like reduced road congestion, noise pollution, and emissions of harmful
substances. Thus, public authorities are encouraging companies to collab-
orate. The city of Zurich, for instance, is funding a research project aim-
ing at improved cooperation between different transport companies by an
IT-based collaboration platform (Schmelzer, 2014). In this spirit, Montoya-
Torres et al. (2016) quantify the effect of collaborative routing in the field of
city logistics. In order to solve real-world instances from the city of Bogota´,
the centralized problem is decomposed into an assignment and a routing part.
By this, the non-cooperative solution can be improved by 25.6% of the travel
distance.
Many other recent studies account for ecological aspects. Pe´rez-Bernabeu
et al. (2015), for instance, examine different VRP scenarios and show that co-
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operations can contribute to a noticeable reduction of expected travel costs as
well as of greenhouse gas emissions. The VRP with time windows (VRPTW)
and with carbon footprint as a constraint is proposed by Sanchez et al. (2016).
Using this model, the reduction of carbon emissions in a collaborative set-
ting, where different companies pool resources, is investigated. The authors
find that the total greenhouse gas emissions can be reduced by 60%, while
cost savings were nearly 55%. Soysal et al. (2016) model and analyse the IRP
in a collaborative environment, which accounts for perishability, energy use
(CO2 emissions), and demand uncertainty. According to their experiments,
the cost benefit from cooperation varies in a range of about 4-24%, while the
aggregated total emission benefit varies in a range of about 8-33%.
Collaboration potentials in stochastic systems has also been assessed by
Sprenger and Mo¨nch (2012). The authors investigate a real-world scenario
found in the German food industry, where products are sent from manu-
facturers to customers via intermediate distribution centers. They are the
first to show that the cooperative strategy clearly outperforms the non-
cooperative algorithms in a dynamic and stochastic logistics system. A
large-scale VRPTW is obtained for the delivery of the orders, capacity con-
straints, maximum operating times for the vehicles, and outsourcing options.
This problem is decomposed into rich VRP sub problems and solved by an
algorithm based on ant colony systems. The proposed heuristics is tested in
a rolling horizon setting using discrete event simulation.
Quintero-Araujo et al. (2016) discuss the potential benefits of collabo-
rations in supply chains with stochastic demands. A simheuristic approach
is used to compare cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios. The authors
find costs reduction around 4% with values rising up to 7.3%.
Yilmaz and Savasaneril (2012) study the collaboration of small shippers in
the presence of uncertainty. This problem focuses on markets where shippers
have random transportation requests for small-volume shipments. The AP,
where the coalition decides where to assign an arriving shipper and when to
dispatch a vehicle, is proposed and modeled as a Markov decision process.
Its performance is compared to a naive and a myopic strategy. The authors
find, for instance, that when it is costly to pickup and deliver the shipments
to consolidation points, the naive policy is outperformed by the policy of the
coalition.
While the majority of papers finds that horizontal collaborations can
improve the non-cooperative solution by around 20-30%, some authors re-
port collaboration profits outside of this range (e.g. Krajewska et al., 2008;
15
Sanchez et al., 2016; Quintero-Araujo et al., 2016). Adenso-Dı´az et al.
(2014a) contribute to this issue by investigating the impact of coalition sizes.
Their computational experiments show that benefits are marginally decreas-
ing with the size of the partnership.
4.2. Methodological contributions
In centralized planning problems, there are several decisions that have to
be taken. Typically, not only the routing but also the assignment of cus-
tomers to depots has to be considered. In order to approximate optimal
solutions even for large real world instances, many authors propose decom-
position strategies (e.g. Dai and Chen, 2012; Nadarajah and Bookbinder,
2013; Buijs et al., 2016).
While a popular assumption is that in horizontal collaborations the VRP
is the underlying planning problem, also collaborative ARP or MCFP have
been investigated. Ferna´ndez et al. (2016) introduce the collaboration un-
capacitated ARP. This yields to a profitable ARP, where carriers have cus-
tomers that they are not willing or allowed to share, and others that can
be exchanged with collaborators. The model is formulated as integer linear
program and solved through a branch-and-cut algorithm. The optimal hub
routing problem of merged tasks is investigated by Weng and Xu (2014). This
problem allows all requests to pass up to two hubs within limited distance.
The underlying problem is formulated as multi-depot ARP. Solutions are
generated using two heuristics based on Lagrangian relaxation and Benders
decomposition. The time-dependent centralized multiple carrier collaboration
problem is introduced by Herna´ndez and Peeta (2011). The authors assume
a setting where carriers either provide or consume collaborative capacity.
Capacities are time-dependent but known a priori, and demand is fixed. The
problem is modeled as a binary multi-commodity MCFP and solved using
a branch-and-cut algorithm. Liu et al. (2010a) define the multi-depot ca-
pacitated ARP aiming for a solution with minimized empty movements of
truckload carriers. A two-phase greedy algorithm is presented to solve prac-
tical large-scale problems.
Not only carriers, but also shippers can conduct horizontal collaborations.
In this case, they jointly identify sets of lanes that can be submitted to a
carrier as attractive bundles. The goal is to offer tours with little or no asset
repositioning to carriers. In return, they can get more favorable rates from
the carriers. Ergun et al. (2007b) define the shipper collaboration problem,
which is formulated as LCP. Solutions are generated by a greedy algorithm.
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In Kuyzu (2017) the LCP model is extended by a constraint on the number
of partners with whom the collaborative tours must be coordinated. Column
generation and Branch-and-price approaches are developed for the solution
of the resulting LCP variant.
In collaborative vehicle routing, typically horizontal cooperations are con-
sidered. These refer to collaborative practices among companies acting at the
same levels in a market (Cruijssen et al., 2007c). Vertical cooperation on the
other hand, indicate hierarchical relationships, meaning that one player is the
client of the other. Wang et al. (2014) were the first to present a combination
of horizontal and vertical cooperation. They extend the pickup and delivery
problem with time windows (PDPTW) to a combination of integrated (verti-
cal) and collaborative (horizontal) transportation planning, where both sub-
contracting and collaborative request exchange are taken into account. The
centralized planning problem is solved using adaptive large neighborhood
search (ALNS) and an ALNS-based iterative heuristic.
4.3. Future research directions
The area of CGA has been extensively researched. The cost advantages
of centralized collaborations have been quantified in several studies, most
of them finding potential benefits of 20-30%. Also ecological goals, like re-
duction of emissions, have been taken into account. However, most of these
studies assume deterministic scenarios. Literature assessing collaboration
potentials, when the central authority faces uncertainties, is scarce. Also
collaboration gains in more complex, e.g. multi-modal, multi-depot trans-
portation systems have yet to be investigated.
Centralized authorities typically face huge and highly complex optimiza-
tion problems, since they have to plan operations for several interconnected
fleets. Thus, sophisticated solution techniques are required. There is a vast
field of problems and methods that have not been investigated so far from
a collaborative perspective. It could, for instance, be investigated, how a
central authority exchanges requests among collaborators, while trying not
to redistribute too much. This would lead to a 2-objective problem, which
minimizes (i) total cost and (ii) deviation from the decentralized solution.
A related question is how the central authority can motivate participants to
reveal their data. These incentives might be provided by using smart profit
sharing mechanisms or, e.g., side payments. To answer these questions, stud-
ies investigating how much information has to be revealed in order to achieve
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reasonable collaboration profits would be helpful. Finally, since central de-
cision makers face huge optimization problems, the application of solution
methods for large scale VRP (e.g. Kyto¨joki et al., 2007) are supposed to fur-
ther improve solution quality. For this purpose, advanced processing methods
like parallel computing should be taken into account (Ghiani et al., 2003).
Also machine learning concepts might be valuable tools to, e.g., tune pa-
rameters (Birattari, 2009) or to automatically identify problem structures in
collaborative settings.
5. Decentralized planning without auctions
If players are not willing to give full information to a central planner,
decentralized approaches are needed. In such a decentralized setting col-
laborators might cooperate individually or supported by a central authority,
which does not have full information. Articles in this area contribute either
to the issue of
• selecting appropriate collaboration partners, we refer to this as Partner
Selection (PS),
• requests that should be offered to collaboration partners, which is re-
ferred to as Request Selection (RS),
• methods for exchanging requests, which is denoted Request Exchange
(RE).
In Table 2, we categorize all papers dealing with decentralized non-auction-
based approaches and give their main characteristics.
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5.1. Partner selection
The benefit of collaborations of course depends on the partners that form
the coalition and the characteristics of their operations. Potential partners
might have different requirements, which have to be considered in the joint
operational plan (Cuervo et al., 2016). Thus, Adenso-Dı´az et al. (2014b)
propose an a priori index that could be used to roughly predict synergies be-
tween potential partners, without the necessity of solving any optimization
model. This index is based on the transportation demands of the participat-
ing companies. However, average order size and the number of orders seem to
be the most influential characteristic on the coalitions profit (Cuervo et al.,
2016).
A model integrating partner selection and collaborative transportation
scheduling is developed by Dao et al. (2014). The mathematical model ba-
sically accounts for transportation times, costs, and capabilities of potential
partners.
5.2. Request selection
Carriers have to decide which of their requests should be offered to collab-
oration partners. Typically, carriers do not want to offer all their requests,
but to keep some of them to be served with their private fleet. An intuitive
solution would be to let the carriers solve a team orienteering problem, and
put those requests into the pool, that do not appear in the optimal tour
(Archetti et al., 2014). A combination of the request selection and the rout-
ing problem of collaborative truckload carriers is introduced by Liu et al.
(2010b). It is assumed that carriers receive different kinds of requests, which
they have to allocate to either their internal fleet or to an external collabo-
rative carrier. The objective is to make a selection of tasks and to route the
private vehicles by minimizing a total cost function. The authors develop
a memetic algorithm to solve the problem. However, Gansterer and Hartl
(2016b) show that in auction-based exchanges, the best request evaluation
criteria take geographical aspects into account. It can be assumed, that these
criteria are effective in non-auction-based settings as well.
Of course, carriers not only decide on requests they want to offer, but on
requests they want to acquire. Again, solving a team orienteering problem,
which gives the set of valuable requests, would be an intuitive approach.
However, this comes with a high computational effort since various different
restrictions have to be considered. A request might be valuable for different
players in the decentralized system. Thus, a coordinating authority has to
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find a feasible assignment of requests to carriers. An efficient method to
reduce empty backhauls by adding pickup and delivery tasks of partners is
proposed by Bailey et al. (2011). Two optimization models are developed,
where one is formulated as an integer program, and the other is formulated
as a mixed integer program. A greedy heuristic and tabu search, are used to
solve these problems. A numerical analysis based on real-world freight data
indicates that the percentage of cost savings can be as high as 27%.
In Herna´ndez and Peeta (2014) a carrier seeks to collaborate with other
carriers by acquiring capacity to service excess demand. Carriers first allo-
cate requests to their private resources and then find the cost minimizing
transport option for excess demand. The problem is addressed from a static
perspective, formulated as a MCFP, and solved using a branch-and-cut al-
gorithm. In Herna´ndez et al. (2011) dynamic capacities are assumed.
In vertical collaborations, beneficial requests or tours have to be selected
for collaboration partners. Ergun et al. (2007a) investigate vertical collab-
oration between shippers and carriers. The authors present optimization
technology that can be used by shippers to identify beneficial tours with lit-
tle truck repositioning. Timing considerations are a key focus of their study.
The effectiveness of their algorithms is shown based on real-world data.
5.3. Request exchange
Once collaboration partners and requests have been selected, players have
to decide on the exchange mechanism. Due to the inherent complexity, it is
not common to exchange sets of unconnected requests, but parts of existing
tours. This complexity can be overcome by auction-based systems. We
refer to Section 6, where auction-based mechanisms are discussed. However,
in non-auctioned-based frameworks, it is reasonable to trade requests being
packed in vehicle routes. Wang and Kopfer (2014) propose such an route-
based exchange mechanism. Carriers can iteratively generate and submit new
routes based on the feedback information from an agent. This information
is deduced from the dual values of a linear relaxation of a set partitioning
problem. An extension including subcontracting is presented in Wang et al.
(2014).
The problem becomes even more complex, if dynamics of carrier coali-
tions are considered. Two rolling horizon planning approaches, which yield
considerably superior results than isolated planning, are proposed by Wang
and Kopfer (2015).
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In the FTL market, typically lanes rather than requests are exchanged.
O¨zener et al. (2011) consider settings in which several carriers collaborate by
means of bilateral lane exchanges with and without side payments.
With regard to applicability of request exchange mechanisms for real-
world collaborations, some decision support systems have been developed.
Dahl and Derigs (2011) present an empirical analysis of the effectiveness of
a collaborative decision support system in an express carrier network. They
assume carriers to solve a dynamic PDPTW by a local search-based heuristic.
They show that with the support of a real-time decision support system based
on an adequate compensation scheme, the network is able to perform close to
the level obtainable by centralized planning. A decision support system for
cooperative transportation planning where several manufacturing companies
share their fleets to reduce transportation costs is presented by Sprenger and
Mo¨nch (2014).
5.4. Future research directions
Decentralized non-auction-based systems have advantages and disadvan-
tages. They are generally assumed to be less complex than auction-based
approaches, since there is, for instance, no need for a bidding procedure.
This might be seen as an advantage, but this comes at the price that none
of the players has structured information on the collaborators’ preferences.
This of course leads to relatively low collaboration profits. To overcome this
drawback, there are attempts to still get some information by, for instance,
doing multiple rounds of exchanges in order to approximate mutual prefer-
ences (e.g. Wang and Kopfer, 2014). An interesting research direction might
be to compare the performance of such mechanisms with auction-based sys-
tems. Also the value of sharing information with collaboration partners has
not been investigated so far.
6. Auction-based decentralized planning
The decentralized exchange of requests can be organized through auc-
tions (e.g. Ledyard et al., 2002), where collaborators submit requests to a
common pool. Due to the necessity of a trading mechanism, auctions are
generally supposed to be more complex than their conventional (i.e. non-
auction-based) counterparts. However, auctions have more potential, since
the trading mechanism can be used to indirectly share information of collab-
orators’ preferences.
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Table 3: References and basic characteristics for auction-based decentralized planning
Reference Model Shipper Carrier Shipment TW PD
Ackermann et al. (2011) VRP x LTL x
Berger and Bierwirth (2010) VRP x LTL x
Chen (2016) VRP x LTL x x
Dai and H.Chen (2011) VRP x LTL x
Dai et al. (2014) VRP x LTL x x
Gansterer and Hartl (2016b) VRP x LTL x
Gansterer and Hartl (2017) VRP x LTL x
Krajewska and Kopfer (2006) VRP x LTL x x
Li et al. (2016) VRP x LTL x x
Li et al. (2015) VRP x FTL x
Schopka and Kopfer (2017) VRP x LTL x
Xu et al. (2016) LCP x FTL x
In horizontal collaborations, auctions are used to exchange requests. Thus,
collaborators typically have both the roles of buyers and of sellers. A central
authority, which is in charge of coordinating the auction process, is called
the auctioneer.
In combinatorial auctions, requests are not traded individually but are
combined to bundles (Pekecˇ and Rothkopf, 2003). This is of particular im-
portance in vehicle routing, where a request might not be attractive unless
it is combined with other ones. An example for this can be seen in the upper
part of Figure 4. Carrier B would probably not be interested in the individual
requests C4 or C5, while the bundle (C4, C5) seems to be attractive.
A bidding carrier receives the full bundle if the bidding price is accepted.
If the bid is rejected, none of the items contained in the package is trans-
ferred to this carrier. This eliminates the risk of obtaining only a subset of
requests which does not fit into the current request portfolio. Table 3 lists
papers on auction-based decentralized planning, and highlights their basic
characteristics.
An early study on auction-based horizontal transportation collaboration
is presented by Krajewska and Kopfer (2006). They are the first to design
an auction-based exchange mechanism for collaborating carriers. Ackermann
et al. (2011) discuss various goals for a combinatorial request exchange in
freight logistics. They give a complete modeling proposal and show the
crucial points when designing such a complex system. Berger and Bierwirth
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(2010) divide the auction process into 5 phases:
1. Carriers decide which requests to put into the auction pool.
2. The auctioneer generates bundles of requests and offers them to the
carriers.
3. Carriers place their bids for the offered bundles.
4. Winner Determination Problem: Auctioneer allocates bundles to car-
riers based on their bids.
5. Profit sharing: collected profits are distributed among the carriers.
In the first phase, participating collaborators can decide either on self-
fulfillment, i.e. they plan and execute their transportation requests with
their own capacities, or to offer some of them to other carriers. Aiming at
network profit maximization, carriers should try to offer requests that are
valuable for other network participants. Otherwise, the auction mechanism
will not yield improved solutions. However, the identification of requests that
are valuable for collaborators is not trivial since the actors do not want to
reveal sensitive information. Different selection decisions are illustrated in
Figure 7, where carrier A selects traded requests based on his own preferences,
while the other carriers offer requests that have a higher probability to be
attractive for their collaborators. In such a system, there is of course a high
risk of strategic behavior, since carriers might increase individual benefits by
offering unprofitable requests, and achieving very attractive ones in return.
The first auction phase is investigated by Gansterer and Hartl (2016b).
The authors show that the best request evaluation criteria take geographical
aspects into account. They clearly dominate pure profit-based strategies.
Schopka and Kopfer (2017) investigate pre-selection strategies, which they
classify as (i) request potential or (ii) tour potential valuation strategies. Li
et al. (2016) assume that carriers in combinatorial auctions have to solve a
PDPTW with reserved requests for deciding which requests should be sub-
mitted to the auction pool.
In the second phase, the requests in the pool are grouped into bundles.
These are then offered to participating carriers. If it is assumed that carriers
can get a set of requests that exceeds their capacities (outsourcing option),
the generation of bundles can be moved to the carriers themselves. The auc-
tioneer could then offer the set of requests without grouping them to bundles,
while the carriers give their bids on self-created packages of requests. The
obvious drawback of this approach is that the auctioneer cannot guarantee
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Figure 7: Carriers submit request to the pool. Carrier A selects requests based on marginal
profits, while carriers B and C take geographical information into account (Gansterer and
Hartl, 2016a).
to find a feasible assignment of bundles to carriers. This the reason why an
outsourcing option has to be included.
A simple method to overcome strict capacities (no outsourcing), is to
assume that the auctioneer assigns at most one bundle per carrier. Since
carriers give their bids on bundles, they can easily communicate whether
they are able to handle a specific bundle or not. However, from a practi-
cal point of view, offering all possible bundles is not manageable, since the
number of bundles grows exponentially with the number of requests that are
in the pool. An intuitive approach to reduce the auction’s complexity is to
limit the number of requests that are traded. Li et al. (2015) do not allow
the carriers to submit more than one request to the auction pool. Xu et al.
(2016) show effective auction mechanisms for the truckload carrier collabo-
ration problem with bilateral lane exchange. Again carriers offer only one
lane, which is the one with the highest marginal cost. In the multi-agent
framework presented by Dai and H.Chen (2011), there is only one request
traded per auction round. Thus, it is a non-combinatorial auction, where
carriers act as auctioneers when they want to outsource a request to other
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carriers, whereas they act as bidders when they want to acquire a request
from other carriers. However, limiting the number of offered items, obviously
decreases the probability to find good solutions. Gansterer and Hartl (2017)
show that, without a loss in solution quality, the set of offered bundles can
be efficiently reduced to a relatively small subset of attractive ones. They
develop a proxy function for assessing the attractiveness of bundles under in-
complete information. This proxy is then used in a genetic algorithms-based
framework that aims at producing attractive and feasible bundles. With only
a little loss in solution quality, instances can be solved in a fraction of the
computational time compared to the situation where all possible bundles are
evaluated.
Complexity can also be reduced by performing multi-round auctions.
These are generally intended to offer subsets of the traded items in mul-
tiple rounds. Previously gained information can be used to compose the
setting for the next round. By this, the bidders are never faced with the full
complexity of the auction pool.
A multi-round price-setting based combinatorial auction approach is pro-
posed by Dai et al. (2014). In each round of the auction, the auctioneer
updates the price for serving each request based on Lagrangian relaxation.
Each carrier determines its requests to be outsourced and the requests to be
acquired from other carriers by solving a request selection problem based on
the prices.
Regarding the last auction phase, i.e. profit sharing, we refer to a broad
survey presented in Guajardo and Ro¨nnqvist (2016).
Chen (2016) propose an alternative to combinatorial auctions for carrier
collaboration, which is combinatorial clock-proxy exchange. This exchange
has two phases. The clock phase is an iterative exchange based on Lagrangian
relaxation. In the proxy phase, the bids that each carrier submits are deter-
mined based on the information observed in the clock phase.
Future research directions. Auctions can be powerful mechanisms for increas-
ing collaboration profits. However, each of the 5 auction phases bears a com-
plex and at least partly unsolved decision problem in itself. To make auctions
efficiently applicable to real-world settings, many challenging questions still
have to be answered. For instance, the strong relationship between the five
auction-phases (Berger and Bierwirth, 2010) has not been investigated so far.
The majority of studies focuses on one of the five decision phases, while an
integrated and practically usable framework is still missing. Also the real-
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istic aspect that carriers might behave strategically, opens many interesting
research questions. In particular, the influence of strategic behavior in the
request selection or in the bidding phase are yet to be investigated. At this
point, effective profit sharing mechanisms are needed, since these have the
potential to impede strategic behavior.
So far, only relatively simple auction procedures have been investigated.
It might be worth to adopt more complex mechanisms like, e.g., multi-round
value-setting auctions (Dai et al., 2014). Also, in the literature there is no
structured assessment of the potential of auctions in comparison to optimal
solutions. These can of course only be guaranteed, if the auctioneer gets full
information. Thus, it is worthwhile to investigate the value of information,
i.e. the assessment of types or levels of information that increase solution
quality.
7. Conclusion
Collaborative vehicle routing is an active research area of high practical
importance. In this review paper, we have given a structured overview and
classification of the related literature. We identified three major streams of
research, which are (i) centralized planning, (ii) non-auction-based decentral-
ized planning, and (iii) auction-based decentralized planning. Literature was
further classified based on the underlying planning problem and the collab-
oration setting.
We discussed recent developments and proposed future work directions,
which, for instance, are
• the application of collaborative frameworks to more complex, e.g. multi-
modal, transportation systems,
• the investigation of strategic behavior, and effective profit sharing mech-
anisms to avoid it,
• a comparative study assessing the advantages of auction-based com-
pared to non-auction-based systems,
• the assessment of the value of information in decentralized exchange
mechanisms.
In order to produce comparable results, an open access repository of re-
lated benchmark instances would be helpful. This would enable a structured
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investigation of performance gaps between centralized and decentralized ap-
proaches. Publicly available data instances are provided by (i) Ferna´ndez
et al. (2016) (http://or-brescia.unibs.it/instances), (ii) Wang et al.
(2014), Wang and Kopfer (2015) (http://www.logistik.uni-bremen.de/,
and (iii) Gansterer and Hartl (2017) (https://tinyurl.com/y85hcpry).
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